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ScienceDirectAirborne pathogens — either transmitted via aerosol or
droplets — include a wide variety of highly infectious and
dangerous microbes such as variola virus, measles virus,
influenza A viruses, Mycobacterium tuberculosis,
Streptococcus pneumoniae, and Bordetella
pertussis. Emerging zoonotic pathogens, for example, MERS
coronavirus, avian influenza viruses, Coxiella, and Francisella,
would have pandemic potential were they to acquire efficient
human-to-human transmissibility. Here, we synthesize insights
from microbiological, medical, social, and economic sciences
to provide known mechanisms of aerosolized transmissibility
and identify knowledge gaps that limit emergency
preparedness plans. In particular, we propose a framework of
drivers facilitating human-to-human transmission with the
airspace between individuals as an intermediate stage. The
model is expected to enhance identification and risk
assessment of novel pathogens.
Addresses
1 Department of Viroscience, Postgraduate School of Molecular
Medicine, Erasmus MC, Wytemaweg 80, 3015 CN Rotterdam,
The Netherlands
2 Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Institute of Bacterial Infections and
Zoonoses, Naumburger Str. 96a, 07743 Jena, Germany
3 Robert Koch Institut, Department for Infectious Disease Epidemiology,
Seestr. 10, 13353 Berlin, Germany
4 PhD Programme ‘‘Epidemiology’’, Braunschweig-Hannover, Germany
5 Universite´ de Lyon, UMRS 449, Laboratoire de Biologie Ge´ne´rale,
Universite´ Catholique de Lyon – EPHE, Lyon 69288, France
6 Molecular Basis of Viral Pathogenicity, International Centre for
Research in Infectiology (CIRI), INSERM U1111 – CNRS UMR5308,
Universite´ Lyon 1, Ecole Normale Supe´rieure de Lyon, Lyon 69007,
France
7 Centre for Pathogen Evolution, Department of Zoology, University of
Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom
8 Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University,
Princeton, NJ 08544, USA
9 Department of Infectious Diseases, St. Jude Children’s Research
Hospital, Memphis, TN 38105, USA
10 Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Emory University
School of Medicine, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA
11 Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Institute of Molecular Pathogenesis,
Naumburger Str. 96a, 07743 Jena, Germany
Corresponding author: Herfst, Sander (s.herfst@erasmusmc.nl)Current Opinion in Virology 2017, 22:22–29 Current Opinion in Virology 2017, 22:22–29
This review comes from a themed issue on Emerging viruses:
intraspecies transmission
Edited by Ron and Linfa
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.coviro.2016.11.006
1879-6257/# 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an
open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Introduction
The horror of airborne infectious diseases subsided sub-
stantially in the 20th century in developed nations, largely
due to implementation of hygiene practices and the
development of countermeasures such as vaccination
and antimicrobials. The recent emergence of zoonotic
pathogens such as avian influenza A viruses (e.g. H5N1
and H7N9) and coronaviruses (CoV) (i.e. SARS CoV
(severe acute respiratory syndrome) and MERS CoV
(Middle East respiratory syndrome)) raises the specter
of future pandemics with unprecedented health and
economic impacts if these pathogens gain the ability to
spread efficiently between humans via the airborne route.
While cross-species barriers have helped avoid a human
pandemic with highly pathogenic avian influenza A
(HPAI) viruses, a limited number of mutations in circu-
lating avian H5N1 viruses would be needed for the
acquisition of airborne transmissibility in mammals
[1]. A global pandemic by SARS CoV was averted largely
by fast identification, rapid surveillance and effective
quarantine practices. However, not all emerging patho-
gens can be contained due to a delay in initial detection,
an inability to properly assess pandemic risk, or an inabil-
ity to contain an outbreak at the point of origin. Before
2009, widely circulating H1N1 swine viruses were largely
thought to pose little pandemic risk but, despite early
attempts to limit spread, pH1N1 caused the first influenza
virus pandemic of the 21st century. Implementation of
suitable countermeasures is hampered by our limited
capability to anticipate the sequence of events followingwww.sciencedirect.com
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or human host. In the immediate future, the occurrence of
(i.e. frequency of spill-over events from an animal to the
human population), the detection of (i.e. diagnostic ca-
pabilities), and the awareness for (i.e. likelihood of public
health services to recognize) novel epidemic agents will
likely increase qualitatively and quantitatively. Updating
of emergency preparedness plans in an evidence-guided
process requires an interdisciplinary concept of research
and public health efforts taking into account the multi-
factorial nature of the problem to aid policy formulation
[2]. Here we build on a conceptual framework for the
classification of drivers of human exposure to animal
pathogens [3] and suggest a framework of drivers de-
termining the efficiency of human-to-human transmission
involving the airspace.
Circle of transmission events
The airborne transmission of pathogens occurs through
‘aerosol’ and ‘droplet’ means [4,5]. In a strict sense,
airborne transmission refers to aerosols (5 mm) that can
spread over distances greater than 1 m, while droplet
transmission is defined as the transfer of large-particle
droplets (>5 mm) over a shorter distance [5]. Here,
we consider airborne transmission of infectious agents
in a broader sense as any transmission through the air
which consists of four steps (Figure 1): Firstly, the path-
ogen is associated with either liquid droplets/aerosols or
dust particles when traveling directly from donor to
recipient, but may also be deposited on a surface and
re-emerge into the air later; secondly, the pathogen is
deposited in the recipient, usually by inhalation, resulting
in infection of the respiratory tract; thirdly, the pathogen
is amplified, either in the respiratory tract or in peripheral
tissues; and finally, the pathogen is emergent at the site of
shedding (in most cases the upper respiratory tract) in
sufficient loads and capable of expulsion. In the process of
transmission, the recipient becomes a donor when micro-
bial replication and subsequent pathophysiological
events in the host result in release of the pathogen.
Drivers impacting on movement of pathogens
through the air
Airborne transmission of microbes can follow different
aerodynamic principles, and some microorganisms are
suspected or proven to spread by more than one route
[4]. Moreover, the mode of transmission and anisotropic
delivery of a pathogen into the recipient contributes to
disease severity [6,7]. There are no substantive differ-
ences between droplet-size distribution for expulsive
methods like sneezing, cough with mouth closed, cough
with mouth open, and speaking loudly one hundred
words [8–10]; however, the number of respiratory droplets
that likely contain pathogens can differ [9]. After expul-
sion, successful transmission requires that the pathogen
remains infectious throughout airborne movement, with
or without an intervening deposition event (Figure 1).www.sciencedirect.com Drivers influencing the success of such a process are those
that define the chemico-physical properties of both the air
mass and the vehicle or carrier, including temperature,
ultraviolet (UV) radiation, relative (RH) and absolute
humidity, and air ventilation (inside) or air movement
(outside) [9]. Their interplay ultimately determines
pathogen movement and stability [11–13]. Pathogen sur-
vival is also influenced by pathogen structure, for exam-
ple, enveloped viruses are less stable outside the host
than non-enveloped viruses [14]. Among Chlamydia (Ch.)
pneumoniae, Ch. trachomatis LGV2, Streptococcus (S.) pneu-
moniae, S. faecalis, Klebsiella pneumoniae, and cytomegalo-
virus, the survival of Ch. pneumoniae (and S. faecalis) in
aerosols was superior [15]. Variation in RH might influ-
ence not only environmental stability of the pathogen but
also the droplet size [16] which in turn defines deposition
rate [16,17]. Eighty percent of droplets emitted from a
cough deposit within 10 min, and highest deposition rates
for all droplet-nuclei sizes range within 1 m horizontal
distance [17]. Pathogens like influenza virus can persist in
the environment for hours to days and have been found on
surfaces in healthcare settings [18–21]. UV radiation is the
major inactivating factor for influenza viruses in the
outdoor environment (reviewed in [22]).
Drivers impacting on the infection of the
recipient
Pathogen-containing large particles (>6 mm) deposit pre-
dominantly in the upper airway, medium-sized particles
(2–6 mm) mainly in central and small airways, and small
particles (<2 mm) predominantly in the alveolar region of
the lungs [23]. In general, airborne pathogens tend to
have a relatively low infectious dose 50% (ID50) value. At
any specific site of deposition within a host, ID50 of a
pathogen is determined by factors such as local immune
responses and the cellular and tissue tropism defined by
distribution of receptors and/or adherence factors, tissue
temperature, pH, polymerase activity of the pathogen,
and activating proteases. Co-infections may alter immune
responses and factors that govern tropism.
Drivers impacting on pathogen amplification
in the host
Pathogens amplify either at the site of initial deposition in
the respiratory tract or in peripheral tissues. For influenza
virus or human respiratory syncytial virus, this is the site
of initial entry whilst other pathogens have either distinct
secondary amplification sites or replicate both locally and
systemically, for example, Measles virus (MeV), Nipah
virus and Mycobacterium (M.) tuberculosis (Figure 1).
Microorganisms often damage host tissue through the
release of toxins and toxic metabolites, as a direct result
of replication, or as a consequence of activation and
infiltration of immune cells [24]. This may allow the
pathogen to spread in the body and replicate to sufficient
numbers to favor onward transmission. Self-assembly inCurrent Opinion in Virology 2017, 22:22–29
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Circle of events leading to human-to-human transmission of airborne pathogens. (1) The pathogen is associated with either small aerosols/large
droplets or dust particles when transported through the air from donor to recipient. This may be directly, or via an intermediate stage involving
settlement on a surface and re-emergence into the air later. (2) A low infectious dose is sufficient for deposition of the pathogen in the respiratory
tract of the recipient. (3) After infection of susceptible cells, pathogens may amplify at the site of deposition only (localized site), or are
disseminated from the primary deposition site to peripheral tissues (secondary site) where additional amplification takes place. (4) Eventually, the
recipient becomes the donor and pathogens are expelled from the exit site. This is (usually) the respiratory tract, but may also be the secondary
site of replication. High infectious loads of the pathogen emerge in the air, and the transmission cycle is repeated.highly organized, surface-attached, and matrix encapsu-
lated structures called biofilms enhances microbial sur-
vival in stressful environments [25] and may even harbor
drug-tolerant populations. Biofilms of M. tuberculosis can
contain resistant populations that persist despite exposure
to high levels of antibiotics [26]. A third strategy is
followed by many human pathogens that have at some
stage evolved or acquired a range of mechanisms allowing
host immune antagonism [27,28] to successfully repli-
cate to high loads in the presence of innate and/or
adaptive immunity [29]. However, several rounds of
stuttering chains of transmission may be required before
a pathogen can successfully emerge into a new host
population. Multiple forays of the pathogen into the
population may serve to create a level of immunity, thus
establishing conditions favoring more prolonged out-
breaks following a reintroduction of the infectious agentCurrent Opinion in Virology 2017, 22:22–29 [30,31] which then enables sustained pathogen/human
host co-evolution.
Evolution to allow host adaptation and/or airborne trans-
missibility can be driven by changes in pathogen popula-
tion genetics at the consensus level but also by genetic
variability of the entire population. RNA viruses exist as a
population of closely related genetic variants within the
host. The ability of a pathogen to generate a genetically
diverse population is considered critical to allow adaption
when faced with a range of selective pressures [32,33].
High-fidelity poliovirus mutants that produce viral popu-
lations with little genetic diversity are attenuated despite
apparent overall identical consensus sequences to wild-
type strains [34–36]. Factors enabling acquisition of novel
traits through high mutation rate, and/or a propensity to
acquire novel genetic material through re-assortment orwww.sciencedirect.com
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ogen replication, amplification and adaptation within the
host. Bacteria additionally deploy transfer of mobile ge-
netic elements (plasmids, transposons and bacterio-
phages) to acquire novel virulence factors, toxins and/
or antimicrobial resistance. Microbial adaptation by drug
resistance is often attained at the cost of decreased fitness,
as illustrated by a reduced growth rate of M. tuberculosis
strains resistant to isoniazid [37], but multi-drug resistant
(MDR) strains can be up to 10 times more or 10 times less
transmissible than pan-susceptible strains [38]. Heredity
of susceptibility on the host side enhances the risk of
disease and transmission, as seen historically with the
selection of populations with innate tuberculosis
resistance by the evolutionary pressure of several, hun-
dred-year-old epidemics in Europe and North America
[39–41].
Drivers impacting on pathogen expulsion by
the donor
The high viral load in the upper respiratory tract com-
bined with a strong cough reflex drives efficient host-to-
host human transmission of MeV [42]. At the level of virus
amplification in host epithelia, lesions are observed in the
later stages of disease as well as extensive infiltration of
infected tissue by immune cells. It is currently unclear
to what extent the host immune response contributes to
formation of pathological lesions and to the transmissibil-
ity of the virus. Levels of exhalation of infected particles
significantly vary interpersonally [43], for example, for
M. tuberculosis [44] and for influenza A virus [45], both in
healthy and in virus-infected persons [10,46], as well as
intra-individually over time [47]. Drivers of airborne
transmissibility appear to be closely linked to disease
progression and severity, to the incubation period and
onset of symptoms in M. tuberculosis [48].
Framework for the classification of drivers
Determinants that confer efficient airborne transmissibili-
ty for zoonotic pathogens among humans, thus permitting
pandemic emergence, can be defined as qualitative or
quantitative changes in key factors that govern one
or more of the four stages of the transmission circle.
The sum of changes in spatial and temporal terms that
facilitate or limit the progression to successive stages of the
circle corresponds to the evolution of emerging pathogens.
To predict the likelihood that a certain pathogen identi-
fied in, or next to, a human being (index patient) will
become a pandemic threat, a multilevel framework of
drivers has to be considered. Categorized in a descriptive
manner, drivers may act at the level of cells and tissues, of
individuals, communities and countries, or even on a
global scale. However, drivers are highly interactive and
may be effective at different scales or levels. As an
example, host susceptibility might be directly encoded
for in the host genome (e.g. by the presence or absence, by
the expression or silencing of genes encoding for pathogenwww.sciencedirect.com receptors). Once the transmitted pathogen finds an entry
into such a susceptible human host, its interaction with the
host immune system ultimately determines whether in-
fection is established and whether it progresses to a point
where onward transmission to a new host is facilitated.
These interactions are influenced at the individual or host
level by other drivers governing an immune response.
These drivers in turn may include the host genetic back-
ground as genetic entities impact on the kind of immune
response (e.g. Th1 versus Th2 bias) developed by an
individual or a group of individuals within a population.
Pre-existing immunity or the presence of concurrent
infections or disruption to the normal functioning of the
immune system including co-morbidities which may rep-
resent more distal drivers or in turn modulate more distal
drivers, play important roles. With effective treatment, the
contagiousness of a particular disease may be reduced not
only by decreasing the number of the pathogens in the
infected site and those that will be expectorated but also
by introducing, for example, antibiotic into the infectious
droplet nuclei [49]. Many drivers are acting at the tissue or
individual level but are themselves subject to modification
at the community level by, for example, the frequency and
intensity of social contact and the composition of the group
a person is interacting with, for example, in terms of health
and hygiene standard and age distribution. Examples are
tuberculosis in the working class in the age of industriali-
zation and the Spanish flu during World War I. More distal
factors are relevant at the country level including (the
variability of) host population genetics (susceptibility of
the population as a whole), demography, public health
strategies for treatment or vaccination or access to medical
care, which are likewise, to some extent, governed by
socio-economic drivers. Air pollution, land use, urbaniza-
tion and socio-economic changes are important drivers of
emergence of airborne infections at the supranational
level. Although human population densities have contin-
ued to rise and reach unprecedented levels, airborne
diseases of public concern in developed countries in the
second half of the 20th century have typically comprised
relatively self-limiting or preventable diseases like the
common cold, seasonal flu and MeV. Continuous devel-
opments like agglomeration of settlement areas in devel-
oping countries, along with urbanization and rural
depopulation, and exponentially increasing human move-
ment in numbers and distances on a global scale, however,
may outpace contemporary achievements in disease pre-
vention. Climatic changes also occur at a global level,
which could have serious impact on infectious diseases
in humans and animals [50]. Extreme weather conditions
alter seasonal patterns of emergence and expansion of
diseases even though direct proof for the influence of
climate change on regional, national, supranational or
global level on the emergence of new or frequency of
established infections is difficult to obtain. To mirror the
complexity of the problem we suggest a concise and
weighted framework of drivers (Figure 2) taking intoCurrent Opinion in Virology 2017, 22:22–29
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Framework for the classification of drivers of human-to-human transmission of zoonotic pathogens by the airborne route (interhuman barrier).
These drivers operate on tissue, individual, community, country, and global levels. The presented framework also makes provisions for the
multitude of influences between levels highlighting that some drivers have implications for several lower level drivers and in sum may be equally
important to drivers considered to act from an outer level.consideration different levels, from cell and tissue through
to global scale but also the multitude of influences be-
tween these levels. While some drivers at an outer level
may only imprint on one driver in the level below, other
drivers can impact several lower level drivers and in sumCurrent Opinion in Virology 2017, 22:22–29 may be equally important to drivers considered to act from
an outer level. Classification of drivers as acting at a more
proximal or more distal level also is not exclusive and
inverted imprinting may occur under several circum-
stances as outlined above.www.sciencedirect.com
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Despite decades of research on ‘airborne transmission
factors’, surprisingly few quantitative data is available for
factors impacting the majority of infectious diseases that
transmit via this route. Furthermore, for some microor-
ganisms, for example, for coronaviruses, epidemiological
or experimental evidence that transmission of the patho-
gens via the airborne route is successful or even contrib-
utes importantly to epidemic or pandemic spread of the
agent remains weak. A large body of work is focused on
influenza viruses and the indoor environment, likely
because perturbations of the indoor pathogen transmis-
sion ecosystem are easier to generate and quantify. Pub-
lished studies assessing viable pathogen counts directly
from subject’s respiratory maneuvers are restricted to a
few respiratory pathogens (influenza A virus, M. tubercu-
losis, P. aeruginosa, S. pyogenes). Evaluation of factors
underlying the highly variable levels of pathogen shed-
ding, for example, by long-term examination of individu-
als to determine how pathogen load changes during
infection of the respiratory tract with different viruses
and bacterial species are urgently needed. Current
technical developments may open novel experimental
opportunities [51]. When designing such studies, con-
sideration of zoonotic and human-specific pathogens as
well as delineating strategies employed by both viruses
and bacterial pathogens will help to identify commonali-
ties in the strategies followed by successful airborne
pathogens. Especially investigation of organisms assumed
to have no capacity of human-to-human transmission via
the airborne route in suitable animal models will help
explain why some pathogens, despite having a very low
infectious dose, are likely not directly transmitted from
infected persons. Examples would be the human-to-hu-
man transmission of Yersinia pestis versus Francisella tular-
ensis, or the assessment why Legionella pneumophila
transmission can occur over long distances from artificial
sources [52], but usually not inter-personally (with the
exception of a first described case [53]).
Beyond representing an ever-increasing ethical and eco-
nomic burden, the recent more frequent occurrence of
zoonotic pathogens in the human population also inheres
in the unique opportunity to further our knowledge of the
prerequisites for airborne pandemic spread. Genomics-
based methods have already allowed a significant advance
in our understanding of the evolution and spread of
bacterial pathogens. In the developed world, whole
genome sequencing is being established for routine use
in clinical microbiology, both for tracking transmission
and spread of pathogens, as well as prediction of drug-
resistance profiles, allowing rapid outbreak detection and
analysis in almost real-time, as evolution occurs in the
wild [54]. Except for influenza A viruses, genetic cor-
relates (surrogates) of the ability of a zoonotic pathogen to
efficiently overcome the interspecies barrier and allow
rapid spread within the human population are poorlywww.sciencedirect.com defined. Any emergence of novel molecular patterns in
microorganisms results from an evolutionary process driv-
en by factors not encoded for in genomes and determined
by the frequencies of genome alterations occurring under
natural conditions. The broad introduction of ‘omic’s’
technologies, advances in global data exchange capabili-
ties and the advent of (bio)informatic tools allowing
processing of large data collections (‘big data’) have
put the technical capacity to integrate phenotypic data
from clinical, from epidemiological and from experimen-
tal studies in vitro and in vivo at our disposal, with relevant
target species like livestock in particular, and allow ge-
nome-wide association studies. Deploying the categori-
zation of drivers and the relative level of their impact as
suggested herein will allow for a weighting of the differ-
ent drivers in the specific framework for any particular
pathogen, and help to predict the pandemic potential of
airborne pathogens.
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